Where Do We Go From Here?
Our critics tell us that Martin Luther King's question, asking directions which depend, in part, on where one is, has lately become an important one for historians.
I had not meant to write a word on professional ethics and practice until I 
  read a headline, "The Cowards of Academe," in the Weekly Standard. 
  It followed by four days a similar attack on the integrity of our profession 
  in the Wall Street Journal. Undoubtedly, academe has its cowards. I've 
  known several and may have been one myself at one time or other. It is a form 
  in which our humanity appears. Yet, the journalists' attack on the Bancroft 
  Prize committee, the American Historical Association, the Newberry Library and 
  Emory University over Michael Bellesiles's Arming America seemed to me 
  well off-target. I wrote a short essay, "Journalists Are Rushing to Judgment 
  about Michael Bellesiles," for History 
  News Network. My argument was a self-evident defense of academic practice 
  and due process, I thought. Yet, the title for the piece won the gun lobby's 
  attention and, like Mr. Jefferson, I learned that not everyone saw my truths 
  as self-evident.1
  The result astonishes me yet. In two weeks of entrenched warfare, I met charge 
  after charge from my critics. Sometimes the tactics were personal, as in the 
  heading of a new thread which read: "Academic Misconduct and Ralph Luker." 
  It was an old canard about timing the release of the King Project's findings 
  of plagiarism in King's dissertation, as if I had been responsible for controlling 
  it. Repeatedly, I tried to call a cease-fire, at my best with humor. When an 
  ally, Cecelia Justice, countered a point by one of my favorite critics, Thomas 
  Gunn, I declared that Justice prevailed in Justice v. Gunn and thanked goodness 
  for due process. Gunn was amused, asked where was the due process and continued 
  firing. The essay on the Weekly Standard's and the Wall Street Journal's 
  criticism of academe, said HNN's History 
  Grapevine, produced more replies "than any other article on the website, 
  indeed, maybe more than had been made to all the other articles on the website 
  combined." They "actually stretch across the page like ocean waves 
  caught at high tide on a stormy night."
In the end, we shook hands and laughed at the e-trenches we had dug. Early 
  on, I told friends that the quality of the debate was not high, ranging somewhere 
  between a dreary faculty meeting and the Jerry Springer Show. Yet, in its course, 
  my critics won my respect with spirited, often well-informed argument. They 
  held Bellesiles, other professional historians and me firmly in their gun sights 
  and fired very pointedly: "your peer review process has failed repeatedly 
  for years and we don't trust your due process." I thought I owed it to 
  new friends in the gun lobby to report back to old friends in the history profession. 
  The battle was, after all, just a skirmish in a larger encounter. We have all 
  read about Joseph Ellis, Stephen 
  Ambrose, Doris Kearns Goodwin, 
  and Michael Bellesiles. The cases 
  of Paul Buhle 
  and Edward A. Pearson have had less public attention.2
  I addressed an open e-mail to two dozen American historians, most of them prominent 
  in the field, asking what, if anything, could be learned from these cases. The 
  list of historians was deliberately ecumenical, including some people who have 
  not spoken to each other in years. I speak to several of them and they to me 
  only episodically. The issues seemed too important to be addressed by political 
  preference or shunned by personal pique. Some of my colleagues communicated 
  privately rather than to the whole group. The small sample of results limits 
  the significance of generalizations, but given the option of anonymity the larger 
  pattern was interesting. In general, political stance and personal differences 
  were of no consequence. Generation was everything.
  Historians of my generation really saw no problem at all. These cases were exceptional 
  and exceptional in several directions. These were either "celebrity historians" 
  who are unlike the rest of us or breeches of trust, functions of carelessness 
  or some singular personality quirk. Contrarily, one was a celebrity historian 
  who we should defend because he had for years been doing successfully what all 
  of us should be doing. Given the limitations of time and dispersed archives, 
  our peer review processes and our due processes work exceedingly well and our 
  book exhibits display our enormous productivity. I was uncomfortable with those 
  conclusions and their internal tensions. Were the celebrities our celebrities 
  or not? Had the celebrities been doing what we should be doing? Oh, really? 
  And don't those book exhibits democratically display deeply flawed and immaculate 
  texts without distinction? Shouldn't they? Who knows which is which? Why don't 
  we know? If we did, so what?
  I was more encouraged by candid responses from a younger, yet already prominent 
  group of historians. These cases did have some things to teach us, they thought, 
  even as they disagreed about exactly what they were. These historians also took 
  seriously a parallel question about the cases' implications for teaching even 
  younger historians and students. I liked the flair and candor of a young Ivy 
  League historian's first point: Historians should not tell "big, whopping 
  lies." That seems like a good place to begin. She followed with three practical 
  suggestions: that committees of the OAH should formulate guidelines on the use 
  of research assistants and develop guidelines on research and the use of evidence 
  which could be disseminated to graduate students; and, finally, recognizing 
  that even the most conscientious effort is occasionally flawed, one should correct 
  known errors in print as quickly as possible.
  Further discussion suggested that two current influences require rethinking 
  our professional ethics and practice. First, how do we appropriate and limit 
  post-modernism's insight that all evidence is socially constructed? It surely 
  means that it can be construed in a variety of ways. It surely does not mean 
  evidence can be fabricated. How do we teach that without denying a legitimate 
  role to the historical imagination? The other factor is the new technology. 
  To put it bluntly, our peer review processes waved Arming America on to a Bancroft 
  Prize and, with breathtaking speed, a lawyer/sociologist used archival sources, 
  cd roms and a published primary and secondary literature which peer review ignored 
  to force us to recognize that "there's a problem here." Given my professional 
  biases, what greater humiliation can there be than to be told that by a lawyer/sociologist? 
  In the short run, this problem may be of greater concern to the quantifiers 
  among us, but my generation is comfortable with the notion of dispersed archives 
  and the future sweeps us into its presence. Our students know or can readily 
  claim that their computers and cd roms reach into archives in many parts of 
  the country, if not yet the world.
  "Trust, but verify" is good advice, even if Ronald Reagan did say 
  it. There is reassurance in these results. The place where we are is embarrassed 
  by some of our colleagues, but there are younger historians among us who are 
  discussing "where do we go from here?"
